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INTRODUCTION
The political lessons of the past twelve years' underscore the fact that it is
no longer enough for the President of the United States to propose legislation,
enforce laws, and handle foreign policy In an emerging era of global
regulation,2 the President also must lead the federal bureaucracy? Executive
oversight has been described "as a way to make unelected bureaucrats
accountable to elected political officials."4 For many years the bureaucracy,
the unofficial "fourth" branch of the government, has wielded a quiet power
to make and enforce (or not enforce) the regulations that actualize the laws
f © Copyright 1994 by George R. Rogers. All rights reserved.
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Indiana University School of Law Bloomington; B.A., 1990, Miami
University-Ohlo.
The Author gratefully acknowledges comments and criticisms of this Comment by Mark Drewes,
Mike Lotus, Matt Johnson, and Dean Alfred Aman.
1. This refers to the terms of the Reagan and Bush presidencies which collectively spanned
January 1981 through January 1993.
2. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 131-56 (1992).
3. The increase in the scope and complexity of executive management, as well as the global
interrelatedness of the issues and problems the United States will face, suggests that the President should
take the lead in the 21st Century, to a greater extent than the President does today. Congress will not
be able to do so, for "[b]y nature, Congress's outlook is more domestic and regional, if not parochial,
than that of the president." Id. at 122.
4. Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Oversight ofAdministrative Rulemaking: Disclosing the Impact,
25 IND. L. REV. 299, 301 (1991); see Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight ofRulemalang: The President
Is No Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568-69 (1987).
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of Congress.5 What originally was conceived as a logical, efficient delegation
of functions, however, has become an impediment to the management of
society 6 For these reasons, the Reagan and Bush administrations focused on
making the government less burdensome on business through deregulation.7
To effectuate this policy, President Reagan built upon the efforts of past
presidents' by issuing executive orders designed to enhance executive branch
management tools.9 Executive Order ("E.O.") No. 12,291, in particular,
facilitated the Executive's control of the bureaucracy Through the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB"), E.O. No. 12,291 imposed a number of
requirements on executive agencies in promulgating new regulations and in
reviewing existing ones. The most significant requirement, for purposes of this
Comment's analysis states that:
"[T]o the extent permitted by law," regulatory action should not be taken
unless the potential benefits outweigh the potential costs. To ensure
adherence to its requirements, the Order [E.O. No. 12,291] accords to OMB
supervisory power over the rulemaking process.'0
This Comment does not examine the issues surrounding E.O. No. 12,291
further than to posit that through this Order, the Executive branch was
usurping the power of the Legislature, and continues to do so" in a
constitutionally questionable fashion.'2 As Alfred Aman, Dean and Professor
5. The existence of this unofficial fourth branch is problematic insofar as one accepts the
democratic agency theory of governance. As Professor Richard Pierce writes, "the Constitution is
premised on the belief that the government should act as the agent of the people." Pierce notes,
however, that "[t]he vast bulk of governmental action is taken by multifunctional agencies. There is no
direct principal-agent relationship between the people and any government agency." Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1239, 1239 (1989).
6. For an excellent analysis of how bureaucracies malfunction, see KEVIN PHILLIPS, BOILING
POINT: REPUBLICANS, DEMOCRATS, AND THE DECLINE OF MIDDLE-CLASS PROSPERITY (1993). Mr.
Phillips depicts the consequences of the lack of bureaucratic accountability and the usurpation of power
by the bureaucracies of the 1980's. Id. at 50-55.
7. See AMAN, supra note 2, at 78-79 ("Deregulation and regulatory forebearance [sic] are the
hallmarks of the global era in which we now live."); see also THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY
(G.C. Eads et al. eds., 1984).
8. See, e.g., President Carter's Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979) (requiring that
"agencies address the anticipated economic impact of certain rules and detail available alternatives");
President Ford's Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3A C.F.R. 203 (1974) (requiring an estimate of the
inflationary impact of all proposed regulations coming from executive agencies); see also Morton
Rosenburg, Beyond the Limits ofExecutive Power: Presidential Control ofAgency Rulemaking Under
Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193, 217 (1981).
9. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1992);
Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986). For overview and analysis of OMB in an action, see
Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management ofAgency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989).
10. Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstem, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal
Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 185 (1986) (quoting the text of Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra
note 9).
11. Dean Aman's theory is that no President relinquishes a power once it is attained. As Aman
states: "Perhaps the most significant trend in administrative law, particularly since the beginnings of the
environmental era, is the steady increase in presidential power over the administrative process." AMAN,
supra note 2, at 121.
12. Id. at 94 ("Executive orders that have broad legislative effects could thus also be considered
constitutionally suspect."); see id. at 94 n.90 (pointing out that the Reagan administration issued
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of Law at the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington writes, "No
one can doubt the need for regulatory management. [But] there must be
limits as well. Executive coordination can easily become aggressive
management, and aggressive management can result in executive legisla-
tion. ",13 Despite the constitutional issues involved, few courts, 4
including the current United States Supreme Court, have addressed the
possible ramifications of E.O. No. 12,291."
One 1986 case, however, emerges as a particular example of this usurpation
of legislative powers via E.O. No. 12,291. In Environmental Defense Fund v.
Thomas,'6 the District Court for the District of Columbia held that the OMB
lacked the authority to use E.O. No. 12,291 review to delay, beyond the
congressionally set deadlines, the making of Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") regulations stemming from the 1984 amendments to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA7). As the court stated, "While this
may be an intrusion into the degree of flexibility the executive agencies have
in taking their time about promulgating the regulations, this is simply a
judicial recognition of law as passed by Congress 17 The court
addressed the issue of the Executive's usurpation of congressional power by
stating that:
A certain degree of deference must be given to the authority of the
President to control and supervise executive policymaking. Yet, the use of
EO 12291 to create delays and to impose substantive changes raises some
constitutional concerns. Congress enacts environmental legislation after
years of study and deliberation, and then delegates to the expert judgment
of the EPA Administrator the authority to issue regulations carrying out the
aims of the law. Under EO 12291, if used improperly, the OMB could
withhold approval until the acceptance of certain content thereby
encroaching on the expertise of EPA. This is incompatible with the
Executive Order No. 12,291 after Congress failed to amend the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1988), to provide for similar regulatory analysis). Id. at 94; see Rosenburg, supra
note 8, at 246 (alleging that E.O. No. 12,291 is unconstitutional).
13. AMAN, supra note 2 at 86.
14. One court addressed the issue in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479
(D.C. Cir. 1986). Also known as one of the "Ethylene Oxide Cases," Tyson involved an Occupational
Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") standard limiting the average daily exposure allowed for hospital
workers to the sterilant, ethylene oxide. Top OSHA officials approved the rule on June 14, 1984, but
when published the next day, it was changed to allow more exposure. The OMB was accused of
improperly influencing OSHA.
One of the reasons for the relative dearth of cases litigating this undue executive influence is the
secrecy in which the executive branch can act. The Executive has the power to influence via the "raised
eyebrow" and through non-public view contacts, which gives the executive an advantage over Congress
vis-A-vis the bureaucracy.
15. OMB's participation in rulemaking "presents difficult constitutional questions concerning the
Executive's proper r[o]le in administrative proceedings and the appropnate scope of delegated power
from Congress to certain executive agencies. Courts do not reach out to decide such questions." Tyson,
796 F.2d at 1507; see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurng).
16. Thomas, 627 F Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).
17. Id. at 571.
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will of Congress and cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the
President's Article II powers."
This Comment explores the issue of the usurpation of legislative power that
Thomas and E.O. No. 12,291 highlight. Executive usurpation exists where the
executive chooses not to enforce a law passed by Congress. 9 For Executive
usurpation to exist, the non-enforcement must go beyond mere exercise of
executive discretion. Usurpation also can occur when the Executive unduly
influences the contemplation and promulgation of public law enforcement
regulations.20
While it is too early in this administration to predict how President Clinton
will utilize past executive orders, the overall question remains: How much
power can and should the Executive exert on the bureaucracy via the "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" clause of the Constitution?2 The
recent case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife22 illustrates the Judiciary's
acceptance of the Executive's broad powers in regulatory law even where it
usurps congressional intent. More importantly, however, Lujan provides a
framework and a means for limiting future usurpation of congressional power:
the bounty-enhanced citizen suit.
This Comment focuses on whether the citizen suit, as amended with a
"bounty '23 provision, protects against usurpation of congressional law-
making power. In Lujan, Justice Antonin Scalia made it clear that the citizen
suit, as currently configured, conflicts with the Constitution's "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed" 24 clause. He uses this clause as the
paradigm for the principle of separation of powers. This Comment, however,
will show that even if citizen standing does raise separation of powers issues,
the fundamental constitutional principal of checks and balances substantiates
the use of citizen suits. For who shall monitor that the "Laws be faithfully
executed,'2' but the courts?
18. Id. at 570 (citation omitted).
19. Executive and congressional power appears to ebb and flow. Nonetheless, when the Executive
fails to enforce a law passed by Congress, under supposed authority of its power to see that the laws
"be faithfully executed," the Executive usurps the legislative intent of Congress. Such usurpation is
beyond the ebb and flow. The citizen suit provides one antidote to usurpation by allowing the Judiciary
to review Legislative and Executive actions in light of both separation of powers and checks and
balances principles. See AMAN, supra note 2, at 103.
20. Exec. Order No. 12,291 and Exec. Order No. 12,498 require cost-benefit analysis to be offered
to the OMB during the contemplation stage of rulemaking. This allows the Executive to hinder and
secretly impact the process through the resulting discussions and tradeoffs. See Gilhooley, supra note
4; Rosenburg, supra note 8.
21. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3, cl. 3.
22. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
23. Professor Cass Sunstem addressed the problem of standing for citizen suitors in Lujan through
the creation of a "bounty" for successful citizen suitors. Cass R. Sunstem, What's Standing After Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992). His source appears to be the
text of Lujan itself. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. To quote a maxim from copyright law,
"The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors. 'A dwarf standing
on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself."' Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections
on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLuM. L. REv. 503, 511 (1945).
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
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Part I examines citizen standing generally Part II argues that allowing
citizen standing does not interfere with the "take Care" clause, and that, even
if it does, the checks and balances principle overcomes the constitutional
question of any interference. Part III articulates a solution to the Lujan case:
the establishment of a "bounty" for successful citizen suitors. Finally, Part IV
discusses and presents a model of the type of legislation that is needed to
enact this bounty
I. CITIZEN STANDING IN GENERAL
"Citizen suit" and, concomitantly, "citizen standing" refer to congressional
authorization for private individuals and groups to sue the government or
private defendants for failure to comply with the laws of Congress.26
Congress chose the citizen suit as a means of enforcing some of its laws,
particularly with regard to environmental legislation.27 Congress authorizes
"private individuals and organizations to enforce environmental regulatory
schemes by directly suing violators in federal district courts when public
authorities have not acted against the violators."2
The concept underlying citizen standing is that citizens will act without
personal injury either to help the government as "private attorneys general" 29
or to force the government to take action.3" In Associated Industries v.
Ickes,31 Judge Frank stated that the private attorney general mechanism
26. Sunstem, supra note 23, at 192-93.
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988) (The Clean Air Act).
28. Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking up the Pace, 9 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
23, 23 (1985), quoted in Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of
Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-
Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337, 337 n.1 (1988). Mr. Blomquist writes, "Congress should, by
amendment to the Clean Water Act, reconcile the novel concept of allowing citizen groups to seek large
public penalties for environmental infractions with the more traditional, and limited, adjudicative
analogies of private attorney general actions under the federal antitrust laws, negligence per se tort
actions for violations of cnrunal statues, civil actions for punitive damages, and the law of citizen's
arrest." Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
29. "Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official person, or on a
designated group of non-official persons, authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in
violation of his statutory powers. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney
Generals." Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) (emphasis added) (granting
standing to group under Bitumnous Coal Act of 1937), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); see
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 225-26 (1988).
30. Professor Sunstem sums up the rationale for citizen suits, as well as Congress' belief in them,
when he states:
Spurred by judicial developments and suspicion of agency "capture," Congress created a wide
range of citizen's suits. These suits would be available against (a) private defendants operating
in violation of statute and (b) administrators failing to enforce the law as Congress required.
Congress was especially enthusiastic about such suits in the environmental area, addressing the
fear that statutory commitments would be threatened by bureaucratic failure.
Sunstem, supra note 23, at 192-93 (citation omitted).
31. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694.
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constituted "an important means of enforcing legislative policy decisions
against agencies prone to capture by a faction. '32
In the current regulatory scheme, Congress assigns agencies the task of
administering its laws according to a huge number of "highly centralized,
rigid, and often draconian regulatory requirements. '33 Because the require-
ments frequently are not accompanied by the necessary resources to enforce
full compliance, Congress sought to enlist the aid of courts and citizens via
the citizen suit.34 In fact, Congress' enthusiasm for citizen suits may reflect
its "fear that statutory commitments would be threatened by bureaucratic
failure '35  and that some agencies may be "captured. '36  Thus, some
authorities call for a "replace[ment of this] command-and-control system with
more flexible, incentive-oriented measures." 37 The citizen suit can be an
effective alternative to fundamental regulatory reform.38
In the current system of American government, most decisions are made at
the agency level, 39 but such decision-making is too far removed from the
people. Constitutionally, government's legitimacy is grounded on the idea that
the government serves the people. This fundamental tenet is embodied by the
accountability that the branches of government owe the people. For example,
the President and Congress are directly accountable to the people by way of
the periodic election process. 4 The Judiciary is accountable at the nomination
32. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1281-82; see Ickes, 134 F.2d at 706. For a discussion of the capture of
an agency, its effects, and the impact that citizen suits can have on capture see infra notes 36, 65-74
and accompanying text.
33. Sunstem, supra note 23, at 221.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 193.
36. Id. at 192-93. The capture theory states that:
An agency is captured when it favors the concerns of the industry it regulates, which is well-
represented by its trade groups and lawyers, over the interests of the general public, which is often
unrepresented.
[M]ost members of the public will be only marginally affected by policy changes. As
a result, only industry members find it economically worthwhile to pay the substantial costs of
forming an organization to influence policy decisions.
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 18 (1992) (citations omitted); see
also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, 250-51 (1993) (considering various
scholars' interpretations of the capture theory).
37. Sunstem, supra note 23, at 222; see also AMAN, supra note 2, at 43 (stating that "[lI]egislation
is the most direct way of achieving major adjustment to our public system of law. It is the
appropriate institutional response to major structural changes in industry and to any fundamental revision
in the reality or perception of regulatory problems."); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
171 (1988) (urging reform based on market incentives and explaining the advantages of such reform
over time).
38. Sunstem, supra note 23, at 222 ("The citizen suit may serve as an effective alternative to
massive regulatory overhaul."); see also AMAN, supra note 2, at 43 (recommending interpretive change
in agency policy as an alternative to legislative change).
39. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1241 ("Congress is no longer the source of most decisions. Most
governmental decisionmaking occurs at the agency level.").
40. The President is elected for a "[term of four Years U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. For
the bicameral Congress, "[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States "Id. at art. I, § 2, cl. 1. "The Senate of the United
States shall be chosen for six Years Id. at § 3, cl. 1.
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and confirmation levels. But government agencies are farther removed from
the people. Much more direct access to the President, the Congress, or the
Judiciary can truly make the federal bureaucracy accountable. 41
Professor Richard Pierce of the Columbia University Law School believes
that the stronger the link between one of the three "core" branches of
government and the people, the more that branch is able to link the people
and the bureaucracy 42 Justice Scalia maintains that the elected executive and
Congress should be responsible for all public policy decisions.43 In contrast
to Justice Scalia's position that the Judiciary cannot be an enforcer of public
policy, Pierce believes that "judicial review [of agency actions] can enhance
the principal-agent relationship between people and agencies by confining
agency actions within statutorily determined boundaries."'4' The more that the
Court restricts access to standing, the more that the democratically account-
able administrative state suffers. Conversely, a liberal standing policy would
allow the people to make the bureaucracy more accountable through the use
of mechanisms such as the citizen sut.
45
II. FAITHFUL EXECUTION OF THE LAWS AND CITIZEN STANDING
A number of statutes already provide for citizen suits.46 In practice, a
citizen suit proceeds as follows: An individual or group such as the Sierra
Club or the National Rifle Association would find an injured member in
whose name they would bring suit against either the government or the
statute-breaking private defendant. Simply put, the plaintiff would ask for
judicial review of the actions of the defendant.
Although the citizen suit was utilized very little at first, its use has
increased dramatically over the years.47 For example, between 1984 and
1988, citizens filed eight hundred notices of suit under the Clean Water Act
citizen-suit provisions alone.43 Moreover, a large number of plaintiffs
41. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1239-42.
42. Id. at 1240.
43. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992).
44. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1242.
45. Id. at 1243-44, 1280-85.
46. See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 165 n.12. See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1003-13
(1983) (White, J., dissenting) (listing several statutes that provide for citizen suits). In fact, Lujan is
ranked second behind INS v. Chadha for the number of statutes it effectively disables.
47. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Pnvatizng Regulatory Enforcement: A PreliminaryAssessment
of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 833, 852-68 (1985).
Until Lujan, environmental advocates saw citizen suits as both a means to solve problems and a way
to heighten awareness of the problem itself. Id. Following Lujan, the use of citizen suits will likely drop
off unless, and until, Congress enacts either a bounty for successful suitors or gives citizens property
rights in the environment. See Sunstem, supra note 23, at 232-35.
48. In 1988, the EPA stopped keeping record of citizen suits. For a breakdown of the notices to sue
under the Clean Water Act from 1984 through 1988, see Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement
of Environmental Lmv, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 392-94 (1990).
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prevailed.49 The high number of suits and the high number of prevailing
plaintiffs both testify to the usefulness of the citizen suit.
The Lujan opinion, however, undermines citizen suits on the basis of
standing. Justice Scalia, writing a plurality opinion, states that citizen suits
unconstitutionally interfere with the Executive's duty to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed."5 Thus, the basis of Scalia's rejection of
citizen standing is the language of Article II of the Constitution. He states,
however, that the doctrine of standing is, at its core, an "essential and
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III."'51
Justice Scalia makes a distinction between a plaintiff specifically harmed
and one with "only a generally available grievance about [the] govern-
ment-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest. '52 The latter
"does not state an Article III case or controversy" sufficient to give
standing.53 Justice Scalia states that to decide a case where a citizen only has
a general grievance "would not be to decide a judicial controversy, but to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-
equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess."54 Scalia
further states:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President
to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." It would enable the
courts, with the permission of Congress, "to assume a position of authority
over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department. ' '55
Thus, Justice Scalia clearly sees citizen standing as a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, but the constitutional analysis of citizen standing
cannot end with the separation of powers issues. While Justice Scalia does
make convincing separation of powersirguments, the equally fundamental
principle of checks and balances demands mechanisms such as citizen suits.
A. The Laws Must Be Faithfully Executed
The fallacy behind Justice Scalia's analysis is that he predicates his
argument on the view that the courts' involvement in enforcing the laws via
citizen standing will erode the traditional role and duty of the Executive and
its agency administrators. In reality, Scalia seems to use standing to promote
49. Sunstem, supra note 23, at 220; see generally Greve, supra note 48, at 351-59 (discussing the
pattern and practice of citizen suits brought by environmental advocacy groups).
50. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
51. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). As Professor Sunstem
admonishes, "it may not be unfair to say that Article II concerns are coming to dominate the
interpretation of Article III." Sunstem, supra note 23, at 193.
52. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2143-44.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2144 (quoting Frothmgham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923)).
55. Id. at 2145 (citations omitted).
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his tolerance for Executive usurpation of congressional power through
executive non-action. 5
If anything, citizen suits potentially augment the Executive's duty to manage
the bureaucracy with. implied accountability from the "take Care" clause.
Allowing the citizen suitor to act as a private attorney general in the service
of the government would create an accountability mentality in members of the
bureaucracy. As Professor Pierce writes: "Agencies' administrators recognize
that they must respond to arguments made by parties that can challenge policy
decisions in court, but they can ignore with relative impunity arguments made
by parties that lack that power."57
Furthermore, in adjudicating the actions of a defendant administrator, the
courts can choose to find that she or he did "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed," 8 and such precedent would guide both future adminis-
trators and future courts. Allowing citizen suits would strengthen the Article
II "take Care" clause.
In addition, a counter-point to Justice Scalia's "take Care" argument can be
found within the language of the clause itself. The Constitution states that the
Executive shall "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."59 Who,
other than the courts, shall monitor that the Executive faithfully executes the
laws?
Justice Scalia posits that "[v]indicating the public interest (including the
public interest in government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the
function of Congress and the Chief Executive."60 He sees the Judiciary as the
wrong champion of the public interest primarily because the Judiciary is non-
elected and not responsive to the demands of voters.6' Yet the principle of
checks and balances requires that the courts, as a "co-equal department
62
monitor the faithfulness of the execution of the laws. The consolidation of the
implementation of law and the evaluation of that implementation makes it
easier for the Executive to usurp congressional power. Thus, the resulting
56. Had Lujan been a clearer case of usurpation, the Court still might not have ruled on such a
"difficult constitutional question[]." Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479,
1507 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see supra notes 14-15. Instead, the Court probably would retreat behind
standing-no power to review because the harm was not individualized and concrete. Thus, in another
area, the Executive would erode the Congress' power without a check by the Judiciary.
57. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1284.
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992).
61. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).
Furthermore, Sealia's approach to jurisprudence consistently underscores that he does not want judges
to be able to "mistake their own predilections for the law." Id. at 1308. The Supreme Court seems
willing to ignore the destructive effect of limiting standing-that factionalism will grow within the
agencies-in order to insure that lower court judges do not rule on personal preference and ignore
precedent such as Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Pierce,
supra note 5, at 1284-85.
62. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2144 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923)).
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need for checks and balances implies that the courts must not limit standing
in order to undertake the role of adjudicating faithful execution of the laws.63
As seen in Thomas, the OMB usurped congressional power by arguing that
the "take Care" clause somehow enabled it not to do what Congress
specifically legislated. In the past, courts have found that this raised "difficult
constitutional questions,16 4 but left these questions unanswered. Now,
through the use of the "take Care" clause and standing, Justice Scalia has
circumvented these difficult constitutional questions.
B. Limiting Standing Results in Capture
Justice Scalia's primary concern is that "judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law" and will not follow the precedent of the Supreme
Court.6" The some seven hundred federal court judges beneath the Supreme
Court do not always follow the current Court's goal of judicial restraint. The
Court, in limiting standing, seeks to "reduce the opportunities for politically
unaccountable federal judges to substitute their policy preferences for those
of politically accountable institutions."66
What Justice Scalia misses in his argument is that the effort to limit
standing in order to limit judicial policy-making actually results in capture,
which undermines his'goal of increasing the democracy of the agency process.
Instead of opening the agencies to the people, limiting standing results in a
small group controlling the agency
The Framers of the Constitution were extremely concerned about factional-
ism controlling the government. 67 In the administrative law context, there
have been numerous examples of agency capture. 68 Capture is a result of two
things: information asymmetries and transactional costs. The prototypical
capture of an agency involves a small group (usually an industry) that an
agency is supposed to regulate for the benefit of a much larger group (usually
63. See AMAN, supra note 2, at 4 ("[T]he substitution of market values [cost-benefit analysis from
Exec. Order No. 12,291] for the regulatory values Congress once sought to further may very well go
beyond the supervisory role that the executive branch is expected to play, inappropnately converting
the 'take care' clause of Article II into an unconstitutional source of executive legislation."); Sidney A.
Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, at 55 (1992) (unpublished
manuscnpt on file with the Indiana Law Journal) ("The prevalence of political oversight dunng the
Reagan-Bush years reduced the discretion of administrative agencies, but the result has not been more
democracy or better regulatory policy. Elected officials have exercised unaccountable power over policy
").
64. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
65. Kannar, supra note 61, at 1304.
66. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1277; see also Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 865-86 (1984) (stating that unlike the Executive and the Congress, the Judiciary is
unaccountable to the people, therefore it should not make policy decisions).
67. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1280.
68. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 86-91
(1955); PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 3-21 (1981);
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1684-87
(1975).
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the public). Information asymmetries and transactional costs prohibit much
participation by the larger group. As Professor Pierce writes:
[T]he small group has enormous advantages over the large group in shaping
the agency's policies. The members of the small group have a powerful
incentive to participate actively in every agency proceeding, obtaining
valuable, detailed information and creating valuable political alliances
with key agency staff members. [In contrast tihe low individual stake of
each member of the larger group limits each member's incentive to
participate in the agency's decisionmaking process. The high transaction
costs of participating effectively limit[s] the group's ability to even
obtain effective representation of their interests.69
The problem of capture is partially solved with the Court's movement to a
democratic administrative state model. Cases such as Chevron v. NRDC"
hold that the President has the power to control agency policy-making. Lujan
reinforces this power when it says that the Executive, and only the Executive,
should see that the laws are faithfully executed." In theory, the Executive
can prevent and override any such capture. This solution is flawed for two
reasons. First, the Executive will not be able to exercise "effective, systematic
control over agents who have responsibility to make policy in narrow,
technical fields."72 Second, "the agents in the executive branch responsible
for a narrow area of policymaking often develop a close political alliance with
a small faction that is well positioned to capture the agency's decision-making
process."73 Thus, in attempting to prevent agencies from being dominated by
federal judges' "own predilections," Scalia has opened the door to capture of
those agencies.
III. SOLUTION TO LUJAN: GIVING A BOUNTY
A. Historical Arguments
Though the Scalia opinion seems to invalidate the idea of a public action,
his analysis is not supported by historical evidence. As Professor William
Fletcher of the Boalt Hall School of Law writes, "litigation in this country has
always been used to articulate and enforce public values." 4 The public
action itself, "an action brought by a private person primarily to vindicate the
public interest in the enforcement of public obligations-has long been a
feature of our English and American Law ""i
Another precedent closely analogous to the general public action and
relevant to the citizen suit argued for here is the "qui tam pro domino rege,
69. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1280-81.
70. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
71. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992).
72. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1281.
73. Id.
74. Fletcher, supra note 29, at 227.
75. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 174 (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REV. 255, 302 (1961)).
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quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur," or "qui tam action" for short. It
literally means "who sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself.
' 76
Professor Sunstein writes: "[A] citizen-who might well be a stranger-is
permitted to bring suits against offenders of the law . Through this action,
people can bring suit to enforce public duties; successful plaintiffs keep a
share of the resulting damages or fines. 77
The idea of a statute defining suits of an informer (or stranger), one who
has no interest in the controversy other than that given by the statute, has
"been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this country ever
since the foundation of our Government."" Professor Sunstem rejects Justice
Scalia's claim that "citizen suits are not the sort of business traditionally
entertained. '79  Sunstein writes: "[C]ourts had 'traditionally entertained' a
wide variety of suits instituted by strangers."80
The quz tam action became popular again in America during the early
1970's, when citizens and conservation groups tried to use it to prevent
environmental destruction.8" The majority of these cases were dismissed and
the qut tam action lost its reestablished popularity However, the reasoning of
the court in United States v. Florida- Vanderbilt Development Corp.8 2 Is
instructional for applying a new bounty statute to citizen suits because it
states that there must be statutory authorization for a qut tam action:
The qui tam action depends entirely upon statutory authorization, as
it has never found its way into common law. The action arises only upon
a statutory grant. The fact that someone is entitled by statute to share in
some penalty or forfeiture does not necessarily also give such person the
right to bring an original action to recover such penalty or forfeiture. There
must be statutory authority, either express or implied, for the informer to
bring the qui tam action. 3
Thus, when the Congress authorizes "the payment of a bounty" and "action
on behalf of the government," the court would recognize the qui tam citizen
suit.
8 4
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed., 1990); see 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *
160.
77. Sunstem, supra note 23, at 175. Sunstein finds the qui tam action to be a powerful precedent
and argument that Article III does not bar "stranger" or citizen standing actions once they have been
congressionally authorized. Id.
78. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943)).
79. Antonm Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 882 (1983). Scalia's article provides much more of his reasoning and
thought process on the issue of standing than does his Lujan plurality opinion.
80. Sunstem, supra note 23, at 214.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Flonda-Vanderbilt Development Corp., 326 F Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla.
1971); Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
82. Florida-Vanderbilt, 326 F Supp. 289.
83. Id. at 291 (quoting Bass Anglers v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F Supp. 302
(S.D. Tex. 1971)).
84. Id. at 290-91.
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More recently, at least four federal courts have found standing for plaintiffs
in qui tam actions."s None of these cases have been reversed or remanded.
The court in United States v. United Technologies Corp. defines the
appropriate legislative authorization for qui tam actions as when "the statutory
qui tam bounty is 'inextricably intertwined with the underlying lawsuit,'
thereby creating 'a concrete, identifiable interest that falls within the confines
of Article III' ",86 Based on his reasoning in Lujan, Justice Scalia would
almost certainly find this concrete, injury-in-fact type of language accept-
able. 7
In another recent qui tam case, United States v. Smith,"8 the court, in
effect, addressed Justice Scalia's separation of powers concern when it stated:
"Qui tam actions . do nothing to force federal courts into exercising
executive or legislative functions.""9 In fact, Scalia's constitutional concerns
would seem to be allayed. Professor Sunsten states:
For present purposes, what is especially revealing is that there is no
evidence that anyone at the time of the framing believed that a qui tam
action or an informers' action produced a constitutional doubt. No one
thought to suggest that the "case or controversy" requirement placed
serious constraints on what was, in essence, a citizen suit.9
The problem with qui tam as precedent for citizen suits centers on the fact
that qui tam actions do not normally involve the government as the defendant,
as is commonly the case with citizen suits. Also, the victor in a qui tam
proceeding usually recovers money Until now, citizen suitors did not
normally receive money 9' The proposed statute in Part IV seeks to redress
these problems and bestow standing to citizen suitors again.
B. Supreme Court Textual Arguments
Historical arguments aside, the Supreme Court itself provides the means by
which to reestablish citizen standing. In Lujan, Justice Scalia writes, "Nothing
in this [holding] contradicts the principle that '[t]he . injury required by
85. See United States v. United Technologies Corp., 777 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), af'd,
985 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2962; United States v. Northrop Corp., 728 F.
Supp. 615, 618-19 (C.D. Cal. 1989); United States v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 722 F. Supp.
607, 614-15 (N.D. Cal. 1989); United States v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1098-99
(C.D. Cal. 1989).
86. United States v. Smith, 775 F. Supp. 172, 180 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (quoting United States ex
rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 1989)).
87. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1992).
88. Smith, 775 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
89. Id. at 180 (holding that the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act did not violate separation
of powers and did not abrogate Article III standing requirements).
90. Sunstem, supra note 23, at 175-76. For specific examples of qu tam actions by early
Congresses, see Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, s. 18, 1 Stat. 469, 474; Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, s.
2, 1 Stat. 347, 349; Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, s. 25, 1 Stat. 232, 239; Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15,
s. 44, 1 StaL 199, 209. For a discussion of early Congresses creating informer's actions, see generally
Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv.
1371, 1406-09 & nn.189-204 (1988).
91. Sunstem, supra note 23, at 176.
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Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing."' 92
Moreover, Justice Scalia specifically recognizes the standing of suitors owed
a bounty He states: "Nor is it the unusual case in which Congress has
created a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private
party for the government's benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the
victorious plaintiff."93 Therefore, it seems that where Congress has statutori-
ly provided a cash bounty for victorious citizen suitors, the Court would grant
standing.94 For all of Scalia's text about the constitutionality of citizen
standing, it is ironic that he allows for such a simple solution.
In addition, in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy Uoined by Justice Souter)
reinforces the idea that the Court would accept cases that have standing by
virtue of a bounty statute. Justice Kennedy writes:
[C]ongress has the power to define injuries that will give rise to a case
or controversy where none existed before, and I do not read the Court's
opinion to suggest a contrary view. In exercising this power, however,
Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and
relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.9"
If Congress designates successful citizen suitors as receptors of a cash bounty,
then Congress will have defined an injury that will give rise to a sufficient
"case or controversy," 96 and that will meet the Lujan test for "injury in
fact."'97 Citizen suitors would have a direct economic injury through the
bounty provision. Should a violation of law not be enforced, a citizen could
sue for its enforcement or judicial review of the non-enforcement upon the
grounds that she or he has a $2500 stake in the outcome. Thus, Part IV
suggests a bounty statute that meets the Court's standing requirements.
IV MODEL CITIZEN SUITOR BOUNTY STATUTE
$
A. Analysis of the Proposed Statute
The Omnibus Citizen Suit Bounty Act is a proposed solution to the
constitutional issues raised in the Lujan opinion and discussed above. It
explicitly creates a right to a civil action for all citizens. Moreover, it bestows
a reward to enable a prospective plaintiff to have the requisite "injury-m-fact"
upon suit.
Specifically, the statute will enact a $2500 entitlement for any successful
citizen suitor. This amount will likely raise objections from both sides of the
92. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2145 (emphasis added) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)
(quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))).
93. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 (emphasis added).
94. At least the Court would likely grant standing under a citizen-suit bounty action where the
defendant is not the government. But see infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text for an argument
as to why standing should also extend to cases where the government is a defendant.
95. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (citations omitted) (Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring).
96. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
97. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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political fence, especially as we continue into a cost-conscious, global era of
administrative law " Nevertheless, the $2500 amount accomplishes two
goals. First, it catapults the prospective citizen suitor past the standing
objections of Lujan. Second, it does so without causing an avalanche of
unscrupulous suits, for the costs of litigating will far exceed the $2500
amount.
However, to bring the statute within the means of more citizens, it will
include a provision for attorneys' fees to be paid to a successful suitor. This
will better enable citizens and public interest groups to sue. The amount of
attorneys' fees will be set at only fifteen percent above the going rate for
public interest lawyers (instead of the more common use of the going rate of
defense lawyers, which allows a "windfall" of excessive proportions).99
Moreover, to avoid frivolous actions and bad faith suits, the statute will
include provisions that allow defendants to counter-sue to recover attorneys'
fees at a reasonable rate, and to sue for a punitive measure of fifteen percent
of the attorneys' fees.
The more difficult question is whether these suitors, even given the
entitlement, will be able to sue the government. William Fletcher thinks that
this is not a problem:
So long as the substantive rule is constitutionally permissible, Congress
should have plenary power to create statutory duties and to provide
enforcement mechanisms for them, including the creation of causes of
action in plaintiffs who act as 'private attorneys general." ' 0
In some circumstances, the most desirable scheme [to determine who could
force agencies to perform their legal duties] might be to permit standing
broadly, conferring the right to sue on 'private attorneys general' who, for
reasons of public policy, should be permitted to sue [the government] as
appropriate guardians of the public interest.'
This matter, however, has yet to be resolved. The way to ensure the
constitutionality of suing the government would be for Congress to create a
bounty for the citizen suitors which is contiguous with a grant to act as
"private attorneys general." This action would independantly provide citizens
the standing to sue the government. Such a dual grant would best serve the
interests of instilling accountability in the bureaucracy Moreover, the bounty
98. See generally AMAN, supra note 2.
99. Greve, supra note 48, at 358-59. While clients and attorneys cannot share m fines, private
enforcers using a citizen suit or threat of citizen suit can:
gain by "converting" Treasury fines into attorneys' fees. A review of consent orders entered
in 1983 revealed that 'an amount equivalent to about 400 percent of the penalties paid to the
federal Treasury was paid to reimburse environmental groups for their attorneys [sic] fees.'
Similarly, civil fines are "converted" into credit projects. Virtually every such project
involves payments to environmental groups for research, "outreach" and education, or land
acquisition. More than ninety percent of "penalties" that industry paid in response to
citizen suits under the Clean Water Act in 1983 went to environmental organizations, not to
the Treasury.
Id. (citations omitted).
100. Fletcher, supra note 29, at 251.
101. Id. at 225-26 (citation omitted).
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statute would revitalize the ability of citizen suits to prevent executive
usurpation of congressional power.
B. A Prototype Bounty Statute
OMNIBUS CITIZEN SUIT BOUNTY ACT
SHORT TITLE.
This Act shall be known as, and may be cited as, the "Omnibus Citizen Suit
Bounty Act."
DEFINITIONS AND CONVENTIONS OF LANGUAGE.
Definitions:
"attorney's fees" includes reasonable costs.
"bad faith" means willful intent to unreasonably hinder or burden
a defendant.
"case or controversy" refers to the constitutional requirement of the
U.S. Constitution Art. III, § 2.
"citizen suitor" means a person who sues under statutorily provided
citizen suit standing.
"entities" means all parties potentially liable to a citizen suitor.
"frivolous" means negligent or reckless abuse of process to hinder
or otherwise burden a defendant.
"good faith" means honesty in fact. It means that a citizen suit is
brought for the purpose of adjudicating the case or controversy at
issue and for the obtaining of the bounty, but not for any purpose
of unreasonably hindering or burdening a defendant.
"injury-m-fact" refers to United States Supreme Court doctrine
bearxng the same name.
"'person" means:
natural persons with citizenship in the United States of
America; or
legal persons (but not government entities) with articles
of incorporation registered with the Secretary of State of
any state(s) in the United States of America.
"private entity" means any non-public legal person or other
business.
"public agency" means any congressionally enacted or funded
agency of the United States.
"standing" means the ability to maintain a law suit.
"statutorily provided citizen suit standing" refers to any statute
which expressly provides for a civil suit made on the person's own
behalf for the purpose of enjoining, compelling, or otherwise
reviewing any action, inaction, enforcement, or non-enforcement of
the laws of Congress.
"victorious" means that the plaintiff-citizen suitor receives a verdict
in favor of his or her case.
Conventions of Language:
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plural also includes singular, unless otherwise specified.
PURPOSE.
The purpose of this Act is to entitle victorious citizen suitors to receive a
cash bounty when acting pursuant to statutorily provided citizen suit standing.
DEFINING THE INJURY
Citizen suitors shall be "injured-m-fact" sufficient to give rise to a
concrete, particularized case-or-controversy when:
any action or inaction by a private entity gives a cause of action
pursuant to any statutorily provided citizen suit standing; or
any enforcement or non-enforcement by a:
public agency;
division of government (at the municipal, county, city,
state, or federal level);
licensee of the governmental body representing any level
of government listed in this section;
United States employee or official; or
United States cabinet member,
gives a cause of action pursuant to any statutorily provided citizen
suit standing.
The amount in controversy shall be the amount payable as bounty for a
victorious citizen suit.
Entities Liable:
Entities liable to victorious citizen suitors are defendants of any
citizen suit made in good faith, pursuant to any statutorily provided
citizen suit standing.
PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR BOUNTY- THE CITIZEN SUITOR.
The eligibility for bounty from a victorious citizen suit requires that the
plaintiff be able to demonstrate compliance with all of the following factors:
That the suit was brought in good faith, pursuant to any statutorily
provided citizen suit standing; and
That the plaintiff bringing the suit is a person as defined in this
Act.
AMOUNT TO BE PAID, SOURCE OF FUNDS, BANKRUPTCY CLAIM STATUS.
Victorious citizen suitors shall be entitled:
to receive $2500 as bounty upon victorious suit made pursuant to
any statutorily provided citizen suit standing; and
to receive attorney's fees set at 115% of a reasonable rate for
public interest attorneys. The court shall make a factual inquiry into
the reasonable rate for public interest attorneys within its jurisdic-
tion, and shall increase this amount to reflect inflation.
Source of Funds: The funds to pay for the bounty of a victorious citizen
suitor shall be levied against:
the funds of a governmental entity sued;
the assets of a licensee sued; or
the assets of any other entity sued under this Act.
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Notwithstanding the provisions of Title 11 of the United States Code (the
"Bankruptcy Code"), the bounty entitlement shall be given first priority
administrative expense claim status.
PROVISIONS FOR COUNTER-SUIT, PENALTIES FOR FRIVOLOUS OR BAD FAITH
CITIZEN SUITS.
Upon a showing of frivolous or bad faith filing of a citizen suit, the
defendant shall be entitled to sue the citizen suitor-plaintiff.
The burden of proof is upon the party defending the original citizen
suit, and the burden must be met by a preponderance of the evidence.
Penalties: The party shown to have brought a frivolous or bad faith
citizen suit shall be liable to the defendant of such suit for:
attorneys' fees calculated at 100% of a reasonable rate of attorneys
practicing defense of citizen suits; and
a punitive measure of 15% of the total attorneys' fees awarded
under this subsection.
The court shall make a factual inquiry as to the reasonable rate of attorneys
practicing defense of citizen suits, and shall increase this amount to reflect
inflation.
CONFORMING AMENDMENT.
This Act shall apply to all present and future acts which statutorily provide
for citizen suit standing.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
This Act is made in response to Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct.
2130 (1992), which denied standing for citizen suitors because the suitors did
not have sufficient "injury-m-fact" to be a case or controversy within the
requirement of Article III.
The Court in Lujan implied that standing for citizen suits would be
recognized where Congress provided a bounty-
Nor is it the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete
private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for the
government's benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious
plaintiff."2
The Act is designed to define an injury for which victorious citizen suitors
will receive a "bounty" The amount of the bounty is set so as to provide a
modest but greater than a de minimis amount, yet to provide the necessary
standing as defined in Lujan. The relative modesty of the bounty and the
inclusion of attorneys' fees at rates corresponding to that which the individual
parties would normally earn is designed to prevent an avalanche of suits.
In addition, the Act provides defendants with the means to stave off
multiple attacks as well as frivolous and bad faith citizen suits. Frivolous suits
or bad faith suits have a punitive damage measure designed to keep the
purpose of the citizen suit clearly in mind. This purpose is to allow citizens
to serve themselves and the nation by suing in this way
102. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
This Comment seeks to increase governmental accountability by restoring
citizen standing. It proposes a model bounty statute to meet the required
"injury in fact" of the Lujan case. Citizen standing must be reconsidered in
order to keep unelected bureaucrats from being autocratic. Standards inherent
in congressional legislation must be followed. Ideally, the executive branch
should monitor bureaucrats through the enforcement of congressionally
enacted laws. But where the executive usurps congressional power in its
enforcement or lack of enforcement, "executive legislation" can result. The
courts are then the legitimate arbiter of whether the laws are being faithfully
executed.

